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Abstract—This paper proposes a novel solution, called a
decentralised, efficient, privacy-preserving and selective aggre-
gation (DEP2SA) scheme, designed to support secure and user
privacy-preserving data collection in the advanced metering
infrastructure. DEP2SA is more efficient and applicable in real-
life deployment, as compared with the state of the art, by
adopting and adapting a number of key technologies: (1) it uses
a multi-recipient system model, making it more applicable to
a liberalised electricity market; (2) it uses the homomorphic
Paillier encryption and selective aggregation methods to protect
users’ consumption data against both external and internal
attacks, thus making it more secure; (3) it aggregates data at
the gateways that are closest to the data originator, thus saving
bandwidth and reducing the risk of creating a performance
bottleneck in the system; and (4) it uses short signature and batch
signature verification methods to further reduce computational
and communication overheads imposed on aggregating nodes.
The scheme has been analysed in terms of security, computational
and communication overheads, and the results show that it is
more secure, efficient and scalable than related schemes.
Index Terms—Smart grid, AMI, security, homomorphic en-
cryption, privacy preserving, selective aggregation, data leakage.
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART GRID (SG) is a next generation electrical grid that,as shown in Fig. 1, supports two-way electricity flows and
communications among grid entities [1]. One component of
SG is the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) that ensures
communications for meter applications. AMI may also connect
users with other entities via users’ smart meters (SMs) using
a hierarchical network structure consisting of building area
networks (BANs), neighbourhood area networks (NANs) and
wide area networks (WANs).
One anticipated application of AMI is the automated meter
reading [1], in which each SM measures its user’s electricity
consumption data (CD) during a short time slot and sends
the CD to authorised entities. Having access to users’ CDs
for each time slot will allow grid operators manage the
grid more efficiently and suppliers forecast their customers’
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demand for electricity more accurately. As a result, the grid’s
reliability and efficiency can be improved. The more fine-
grained the CDs sent to entities are, the more the SG reliability
and efficiency may be improved (without considering the
extra costs incurred as the result of the additional process-
ing/communication).
However, uncontrolled access to fine-grained CDs may put
users’ privacy at risk. Entities that have access to CDs may,
for example, use non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM) tech-
niques [2] to build individual users’ electricity consumption
patterns, breaching users’ privacy. The more fine-grained the
CDs, the greater the risks, as far as the users’ privacy is
concerned. Thus, it is important to protect users’ CDs from
unauthorised access while collecting the data.
One way to achieve this is to aggregate users’ CDs for
each time slot before making the data available to authorised
entities, assuming that the aggregated CD (ACD) obtained
in each slot provides sufficient information to the entities.
Also, intermediate nodes that aggregate the data should not
be allowed to access the CDs. This can be achieved by using
a homomorphic encryption technique [3]. Such a technique
allows intermediate nodes to perform a specific linear algebraic
operation on ciphertexts, which is equivalent to a different
operation conducted on the corresponding plaintexts.
There are schemes [4]–[15] published in literature, which
are designed to secure data aggregations and collections, but
they assume that there is only a single recipient of ACD of all
the users. In other words, these schemes are designed based
on a single-recipient system model. However, in a liberalised
electricity market (which is deployed in most European coun-
tries) there are multiple entities (e.g., grid operators, suppliers)
that are authorised to access ACDs of different sets of users
for legitimate purposes, and these access should be granted
in conformance to the least privilege principle. Clearly, the
existing schemes are not designed for a liberalised electricity
market, and more work is necessary to allow a migration from
the single-recipient system model to a multi-recipient one.
One naı¨ve approach to realise this migration is to allow a
‘prime’ authorised entity (one which obtains the aggregated
data in a single-recipient system model) to share the aggre-
gated data with other ‘secondary’ authorised entities. However,
this approach has two main drawbacks: (1) the prime entity
knows the aggregated data of each subset of users requested by
each of the secondary entities (and this might not be desirable
in a liberalised market) and (2) the secondary entities can not
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Fig. 1. A conceptual architecture of SG.
verify the correctness of the aggregated data, i.e., they can not
verify that the data they receive from the prime entity is in
fact the aggregated data of the requested subset of users.
One way to overcome these drawbacks would be to apply
one of the existing solutions multiple times, i.e., to encrypt
a user’s CD multiple times, each time using a different au-
thorised entity’s homomorphic public key, generating multiple
ciphertexts, one for each of the authorised entities. Then,
the ciphertexts from different users that are intended for the
same entity are aggregated and the result is sent to that
entity. Thereby, all the authorised entities will only receive
the ACD of the users under their managements. However,
this naı¨ve solution is not efficient as each SM will need to
encrypt the same data multiple times to generate multiple
ciphertexts. Therefore, there is a need for a new aggregation
method that could serve the multi-recipient system model with
less computational and communication overheads. In addition,
considering the large number of SMs anticipated, having a
single entity to perform the aggregation would place excessive
computational burden on it, thus making the entity a potential
performance bottleneck and an easy target for attacks. Hence,
it is desirable to distribute the computational load of data
aggregation across multiple entities, and the selection of these
entities should be such that any additional communication
costs introduced are minimal.
This paper proposes such a novel solution called a decen-
tralised, efficient and privacy-preserving selective aggregation
(DEP2SA) scheme. DEP2SA supports aggregation of CDs
in respective users’ suppliers and locations, so authorised
entities can only get the fine-grained ACDs relevant to, and
necessary for, their respective business dealings. In this way,
users’ privacy can better be preserved. Furthermore, DEP2SA
allows grid operators (prime entities) to share their respective
aggregated data with suppliers (the secondary entities) in such
a way that the suppliers could verify the correctness of the
received data with the assistance of a trusted entity. This work
extends our previous research [16] in improving the aggrega-
tion method and proposing a method to quantify the level of
private data leakage from ACDs. The main contributions of
the paper are fourfold.
• First, it introduces a multi-recipient system model which
is suited to liberalised electricity markets and a well-
studied cyber threat model, and it specifies a set of
functional and security requirements for the AMI.
• Secondly, it proposes a novel scheme (i.e., DEP2SA) that
supports a selective and secure delivery of ACDs to re-
spective multiple authorised recipients based on the need-
to-know and least privilege principles. In comparison with
related schemes, DEP2SA imposes less computational
and communication overheads, while achieving privacy-
preserving CD collection and distribution.
• Thirdly, it analyses ACDs of varying numbers of users
and proposes a simple method to quantify the level of
private data leakage from these ACDs. This method can
be used to determine the minimum number of users
whose CDs should be aggregated to ensure a given level
of privacy preservation.
• Fourthly, it compares DEP2SA to two recent, most rele-
vant work: EPPA [8] and a scheme [9] that also aggre-
gates the data in a decentralised manner. The comparison
results demonstrate that DEP2SA is more efficient, in
terms of computational and communication costs, than
these schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section
II discusses the related work. Sections, III and IV, respectively,
present design preliminaries and main building blocks used
in the design of DEP2SA. Section V describes the DEP2SA
scheme in detail, which is followed by its security analysis in
Section VI, users’ private data leakage analysis in Section VII,
and DEP2SA performance evaluation in Section VIII. Finally,
Section IX concludes the paper. Table I lists the acronyms
used in the paper.
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ACRONYMS
AMI advanced metering infrastructure SG smart grid
DCC data communications company SM smart meter
DNO distribution network operator ACD aggregated CD
TSO transmission system operator ECD encrypted CD
CD electricity consumption data AECD aggregated ECD
BAN building area network GW gateway
NAN neighbourhood area network BG BAN GW
WAN wide area network NG NAN GW
TA trusted authority WG WAN GW
II. RELATED WORK
The importance of securing the SG and preserving users’
privacy is well recognised by standardisation bodies, e.g.,
NIST [17], IETF [18] and ETSI [19], and the research commu-
nity [20]–[26]. A number of efforts and proposals have been
made to strengthen the protection. For example, Efthymiou
et al. [27] proposed a method for anonymising users’ fine-
grained CDs sent by SMs, so authorised entities cannot link
the received CDs to their originators. Lin et al. [28] proposed
a system to allow users’ CDs to be accessed at multiple time
granularities, each identified by a random number. A random
number is added to a user’s fine-grained CD and the result is
sent to, and stored in, a central database. The user can govern
the time granularity at which her/his CD can be accessed
by providing the corresponding random number(s) to data
requesters. Ma´rmol et al. [29] proposed a protocol to allow
users to report their CDs to a supplier in a privacy-preserving
manner. With this proposal, each user’s SM encrypts the user’s
CD with a unique encryption key and then sends the encrypted
CD (ECD) and the key to the supplier and a key aggregator,
respectively. The key aggregator aggregates all the encryption
keys received and sends the resulting key to the supplier.
The supplier, then, aggregates all the received ECDs and
uses the aggregated key to recover the ACD. Although the
solutions proposed in [27]–[29] can preserve users’ privacy,
they are not scalable. As the number of users increases, the
computational and communication overheads in the entire grid
increase linearly.
Clearly, communicating ACDs instead of CDs helps to
reduce communication overheads and preserve users’ privacy.
Our discussions here focus on privacy preservation through the
use of homomorphic encryption. Li et al. [5] proposed an in-
network aggregation scheme that uses SMs to aggregate users’
ECDs en route for an authorised entity. The scheme achieves
a good level of scalability. However, it only protects users’
CDs against passive attacks. Deng et al. [6] overcame this
limitation by proposing to digitally sign each ECD. Li et al. [7]
improved [6] in terms of reducing overhead costs by using the
Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signature scheme that allows the
batch verification of multiple signatures. They also introduced
an incremental verification technique that allows the collector
node to identify SMs feeding fake CDs. Li et al. [30] proposed
an efficient and fault-diagnosable authentication architecture
for AMI, which is also based on the BLS signature scheme.
To further reduce overheads, Lu et al. [8] proposed a scheme
which packs user’s multidimensional CDs into a single ECD,
whereas Ruj et al. [9] proposed a decentralised aggregation
method, in which data are aggregated at local gateways en
route for a central entity. A review and comparison of a
number of aggregation schemes can be found in [14].
These existing solutions are designed for a single-recipient
system model where one entity (per region) is assumed to do
both, manage the grid and supply all the users (within the
region) with electricity. These solutions may not be secure
and efficient when being applied to a liberalised market,
e.g., the UK market [31], where, to allow competition, grid
management and electricity supply are done by different
entities, and within one region, more than one entity may
supply the users with electricity. To support this multi-entity
model, Rottondi et al. [32] proposed an architecture containing
additional functional entities, called privacy preserving nodes
(PPNs). Each SM splits its user’s CD into shares using a secret
sharing scheme and sends these shares to different PPNs. PPNs
perform aggregation of different sets of the shares based on
the CDs’ intended recipients. This solution has two drawbacks.
First, it introduces the additional entities of PPNs, and this
increases the SG complexity. Secondly, it employs a secret
sharing scheme that requires the distribution of shares, and this
increases communication overheads. The first drawback can be
overcome by allocating the tasks of PPNs to existing SG nodes
(e.g., gateways) [33]. However, the second drawback still
remains. In addition, those existing schemes, which employ
a homomorphic cryptosystem to protect the confidentiality of
the collected data, have not considered any security threats
imposed by authorised insiders, such as eavesdropping attacks
by authorised entities. If an authorised entity could eavesdrop
a user’s ECD prior to data aggregation, it can recover the
user’s CD. To address these limitations, we here propose a
novel data aggregation and collection solution, i.e., DEP2SA.
DEP2SA is particularly designed for a multi-recipient system
model and achieves security, privacy-preservation, efficiency
and scalability.
It should be mentioned that the decentralised and selective
aggregation method has been previously published in [16].
However, this paper extends the aggregation method to allow
aggregating nodes to (i) detect and discard data coming from
malfunctioning/malicious SMs, (ii) report such SMs to grid
operators, and (iii) aggregate only the authentic data sent by
legitimate SMs. The MUSP system [34] has also used the
same aggregation method as in [16]. However, MUSP does not
extend the aggregation method, rather it combines this method
with other techniques to support additional services such as
user billing and supplier and/or account holder switching.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section details the system and threat model, assump-
tions, notations and requirements used in the design of the
DEP2SA scheme.
A. System Model
The system model, as shown in Fig. 2, is adapted to the
UK’s liberalised market [31] and consists of the following
entities:
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Fig. 2. A multi-recipient system model (architecture) used in the design of DEP2SA.
• Trusted authority (TA): Trusted entity that regulates elec-
tricity markets, e.g., in UK this is Ofgem [35].
• Grid operators: There is one transmission system operator
(TSO) responsible for balancing the entire grid and Nd
distribution network operators (DNOs) each responsible
for maintaining the distribution network in a particular
region and charging suppliers distribution network fees
based on the CDs of the suppliers’ customers in this
region.
• Suppliers: There are Ns suppliers each responsible for
supplying the electricity to its customers who may be
located in different regions across the grid.
• User: A customer who demands, consumes and pays
his/her supplier for the electricity consumed.
• Smart meter (SM): Advanced metering device that mea-
sures its user’s CD on a per time slot, tn, basis.
• Data communications company (DCC): A third party en-
tity that is responsible for collecting and communicating
users’ data to authorised SG entities [36].
• Networking facility: It connects users’ SMs to the DCC
via a hierarchical network structure [21] consisting of
BANs, NANs and WANs. Each BAN, NAN and WAN
has a gateway (GW), i.e., a BAN GW (BG), an NAN
GW (NG) and a WAN GW (WG). A higher level GW
collects data received from a number of gateways at the
level immediate below it. A GW at the lowest level, i.e.,
BG, collects data received from SMs that are connected
to the GW. The DCC collects data from WGs.
B. Threat Model
The threat model used in the DEP2SA design is as follows:
• Users are untrustworthy and curious. They may try to
modify CDs sent by their SMs in attempt to gain financial
advantage and/or learn other users’ CDs.
• DNOs are semi-trusted and curious. They report correct
data to TSO (so TSO can keep the grid in balance) but
they may manipulate data sent to suppliers in an attempt
to gain financial advantage. They may also try to learn
individual users’ CDs and/or ACDs of any group of users
located in other DNOs’ regions.
• DCC is honest but curious. It follows protocol specifica-
tions but it may try to find out CDs of individual users
and/or ACDs of any group of users. Also, the DCC is
trusted by the authorised data recipients (i.e., TSO, DNOs
and suppliers) to act as expected.
• Suppliers are suspicious and curious. They do not assume
(or they do not trust) that DNOs would always charge
them the right distribution network fees. They may also
attempt to learn individual users’ CDs and/or ACDs of
any group of customers contracted by their competitors
(i.e., other suppliers).
• External entities are untrustworthy or even malicious.
They may eavesdrop data in transit trying to gain access
to confidential data and/or modify the data in an attempt
to disrupt the SG.
C. Assumptions
The following assumptions are used in the DEP2SA design:
• Each entity in the system model has a unique ID.
• SMs are tamper-proof and sealed. No one (including their
users) could tamper with them without being detected.
• All entities are time synchronised.
• For the sake of simplicity, each BG collects data from
Nsm (number of) SMs, each NG collects data from Nbg
BGs and each WG from Nng NGs. There are Nwg WGs
in each region and NGwg WGs in the whole grid.
D. Notations
We denote the ith SM as smi ∈ SM, where SM is the set
of all the SMs in the grid, and the CD during the nth time
slot, tn, measured by smi as etnsmi ∈ Etn , where Etn is the set
of CDs during tn measured by all the SMs (of all the users)
in the grid. We denote the following subsets of SM and Etn :
• SMdj ⊂ SM as the set of all the SMs operated by the
jth DNO, dj , (located in region j).
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NOTATIONS
Symbol Meaning
tn nth time slot, n = {1, . . . ,Nt}
dj jth DNO (operating in region j), j = {1, . . . ,Nd}
su uth supplier, u = {1, . . . ,Ns}
smi ith SM
SM set of all the SMs in the grid
SMdj set of all the SMs operated by dj
SMsu set of all the SMs whose users are supplied by su
SMdj ,su set of all the SMs operated by dj and whose users are
supplied by su
SMbgβ ,dj set of all the SMs connected to βth BG and operated
by dj
SMbgβ ,dj ,su set of all the SMs connected to bgβ , operated by dj
and whose users are supplied by su
etnsmi CD (of a user) during tn measured by smi
Etn , Etndj , E
tn
su set of CDs during tn measured by all the SMs belong-
ing to SM, SMdj , SMsu
Etndj ,su set of CD during tn measured by all the SMs belongingto SMdj ,su
IDi, σi identity of entity i, digital signature created by i
TSi, TStn time stamp of entity i, of time slot tn
xi, yi secret, public key of entity i for signing, verifying
hpki, hski homomorphic public, private key pair of entity i
Certi digital certificate of entity i
kbgβ key shared between bgβ and all its child SMs
Ctnsmi , csmi ciphertext of e
tn
smi , generated by smi using kbgβ
Ek , Dk symmetric encryption, decryption using key k
Encpki asymmetric encryption using entity i’s public key
Decski asymmetric decryption using entity i’s private key
mp, mr message pending, received status of a SM
ma, magg message authentic, aggregated status of a SM
Nmp , Nmr number of SMs with a status mp, mr
Nma , Nmagg number of SMs with a status ma, magg
Nsm number of SMs connected to each BG
Nbg number of BGs connected to each NG
Nng number of NGs connected to each WG
Nwg, NGwg number of WGs in each DNO’s region, in the grid
• SMsu ⊆ SM as the set of all the SMs whose users are
supplied by the uth supplier, su.
• SMdj ,su ⊆ SMdj and ⊆ SMsu as the set of all the SMs
operated by dj and whose users are supplied by su.
• SMbgβ ,dj ⊂ SMdj as the set of all the SMs connected to
βth BG, bgβ , and operated by dj .
• SMbgβ ,dj ,su ⊆ SMbgβ ,dj as the set of all the SMs
connected to bgβ , operated by dj and whose users are
supplied by su.
• Etndj , E
tn
su and E
tn
dj ,su as the sets of CDs during tn measured
by the SMs belonging to the sets SMdj , SMsu and
SMdj ,su , respectively.
Also,
∑
(X) denotes the aggregate (sum) value of all elements
in the set X . More notations are given in Table II.
E. Design Requirements
The AMI application should satisfy the following functional
and security requirements.
1) Functional Requirements:
(F1) Each malfunctioning and/or under-attack SM/GW should
be identified as early as possible and reported to the
regional DNO, so necessary actions can be taken.
(F2) At each tn, each DNO, dj , should be able to access
a)
∑
(Etndj ), so it can better manage the distribution
network in its region, and
b)
∑
(Etndj ,su ) for u = {1, . . . ,Ns}, so it can split
distribution network fees fairly among suppliers.
(F3) At each tn, each supplier, su, should be able to access
a)
∑
(Etnsu ), so it can predict its customers’ demand
accurately to avoid imbalance fines, and
b)
∑
(Etndj ,su ) for j = {1, . . . ,Nd}, so it can be assured
that it pays the correct distribution network fee to
each DNO, i.e., it is not over(under)charged.
(F4) At each tn, the TSO should be able to access
a) all
∑
(Etndj ) for j = {1, . . . ,Nd}, and
b)
∑
(Etn ), so it can balance the grid efficiently.
2) Security Requirements:
(S1) Message authenticity: The recipient should be assured
that the message has not been altered during transit, is
fresh and indeed from the claimed source.
(S2) Confidentiality of users’ data: Users’ fine-grained ACDs
should only be accessed by authorised entities.
(S3) User privacy preservation: individual users’ fine-grained
CDs should not be revealed to any SG entity.
(S4) Authorisation: Entities should only be allowed to access
the ACDs of their users, i.e., the users they operate in case
of a DNO; the users they supply in case of a supplier.
(S5) Availability: Protocols should be designed such that they
are resilient to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
IV. BUILDING BLOCKS
The bilinear pairing based BLS short signature scheme
[37], the aggregate signature scheme [38] and the Paillier
cryptosystem [3] are used as the building blocks in our design.
This section reviews briefly these schemes.
A. Bilinear Pairing based Signature Schemes
The BLS short signature scheme [37] generates a signature
with its length being only half of the size of a DSA signature
for a similar level of security. It also allows the construction
of an aggregate signature [38] from multiple signatures signed
on different messages by different users and this aggregate
signature can be batch verified.
Let (G,GT , q, g, e,H) be the digital signature system pa-
rameters where G and GT are two cyclic groups of the same
prime order q, g ∈ G is a generator, e : G × G → GT is a
bilinear map (i.e., e is efficiently computable, e(g, g) 6= 1 and
e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab for all a, b ∈ Z [39]) and H : {0, 1}∗ →
G is a cryptographic hash function.
1) BLS Short Signature Scheme: The scheme comprises
three algorithms: a key generation algorithm (KeyGen), a
signature generation algorithm (SigGen) and a signature veri-
fication algorithm (SigVer).
• KeyGen: Select randomly x R←− Zq and compute y = gx.
The secret key is x ∈ Zq . The public key is y ∈ G.
• SigGen: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and secret key x,
compute the signature σ = H(m)x, σ ∈ G.
• SigVer: Given the public key y, message m, and signature
σ, accept if e(g, σ) = e(y,H(m)) holds.
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Fig. 3. An overview of DEP2SA.
2) Aggregate Signature Scheme: The scheme comprises
four algorithms: a key generation algorithm (KeyGen), a sig-
nature generation algorithm (SigGen), a signature aggregation
algorithm (SigAgg) and a signature verification algorithm
(SigVer).
• KeyGen & SigGen: These two algorithms are the same
as the algorithms described in Section IV-A1. Suppose
that there are n distinct users. Each user ui, where i =
{1, . . . , n}, generates its secret key, xi, and public key, yi.
Then, ui signs its message mi and obtains its signature,
σi.
• SigAgg: An aggregated signature is computed by multi-
plying individual signatures, σagg =
∏n
i=1 σi.
• SigVer: Given n users’ public keys, y1, . . . , yn, their mes-
sages, m1, . . . ,mn, and the aggregate signature on the
messages, σagg , compute H(mi). Accept if all the mes-
sages are distinct and e(g, σagg) =
∏n
i=1 e(yi, H(mi))
holds.
B. Paillier Cryptosystem
The Paillier cryptosystem [3] has an additive homomor-
phism property, and it is relatively efficient and semanti-
cally secure. It comprises three algorithms: a key generation
algorithm (KeyGen), an encryption algorithm (Enc) and a
decryption algorithm (Dec).
• KeyGen: Choose two large prime numbers (p1, q1).
Calculate n = p1.q1, λ = lcm (p1 − 1, q1 − 1). Define
L(u) = (u − 1)/n. Choose a generator g ∈ Z∗n2 .
Calculate µ = (L(gλmodn2))−1modn. The public key
is hpk = (n, g) and the private key is hsk = (λ, µ).
• Enc: Given a message m ∈ Zn, choose a random number
r ∈ Z∗n. Compute the ciphertext C = Enc(m) =
gm. rnmodn2.
• Dec: Given the ciphertext C ∈ Z∗n2 , recover the message
m = Dec(C) = L(Cλmodn2). µmodn.
The Paillier cryptosystem has the following two properties:
• Additive homomorphism: Multiplying the ciphertexts of
x messages results in a ciphertext of the sum of the
messages, e.g.,
C(m1).C(m2) = (gm1 . rn1 ).(g
m2 . rn2 )modn
2
= g(m1+m2). (r1.r2)
n
modn2 (1)
= C(m1 +m2).
• Random number recovery: Given a message, m, its
ciphertext C and the private key hsk, the random number
r used in the encryption of m can be recovered by
computing the following equation.
r = (Cg−mmodn)n
−1modλ
modn. (2)
V. THE DEP2SA SCHEME
This section describes our novel data aggregation scheme,
the DEP2SA scheme. Prior to the detailed description, we first
give an overview of the scheme (which is also shown in Fig. 3)
and outline the system initialisation process.
A. Overview of DEP2SA
Each DNO has a homomorphic private/public key pair, so
each of them acts as an independent prime authorised entity.
Each SM encrypts its data with the homomoprhic public key
of its regional DNO and sends the ciphertext (attached with the
ID of the DNO and the ID of its user’s contracted supplier)
to its local gateway. Each gateway aggregates the received
ciphertexts based on the attached supplier ID and forwards the
resulted ciphertexts to the next level gateway (DCC). The DCC
aggregates the received ciphertexts based on the attached DNO
ID and supplier ID, producing respective region-supplier-
based ciphertexts. Then, the DCC forwards selections of these
ciphretexts to their respective recipients, i.e. the corresponding
DNOs and suppliers. In this way, each DNO/supplier only
receives the aggregated ciphertexts attached with its own ID.
It is worth noting that the suppliers can not decrypt these
cipertexts; they use these ciphertexts for verification purposes.
Upon the receipt of the region-supplier-based ciphertexts,
each DNO performs the following tasks: (1) decrypts the
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KEYS AND CERTIFICATES OF ENTITIES
Entity Secret Keys Public Keys Certificate
TA xta yta Certta = {IDta, yta}
TSO xtso, sktso ytso, pktso Certtso = {IDtso, ytso, pktso}
DNO xdj , skdj , hskdj ydj , pkdj , hpkdj Certdj = {IDdj , ydj , pkdj , hpkdj }
Supplier xsu , sksu ysu , pksu Certsu = {IDsu , ysu , pksu}
DCC xdcc ydcc Certdcc = {IDdcc, ydcc}
BG xbgβ ybgβ Certbgβ = {IDbgβ , ybgβ}
NG xngη yngη Certngη = {IDngη , yngη}
WG xwgω ywgω Certwgω = {IDwgω , ywgω}
SM xsmi ysmi Certsmi = {IDsmi , ysmi}
ciphertexts to obtain the corresponding supplier-based ACDs
of the users located in its region of operation, (2) uses the
ACDs along with its homomorphic private key to recover the
random number embedded in each of these ciphertexts, (3)
sends each pair of the recovered ACD and the random number
to their respective suppliers (secondary authorised entities),
and (4) aggregates all of its recovered supplier-based ACDs
and sends the resulted ACD to the TSO.
Upon the receipt of each ACD and random number pair
from each of the DNOs, each supplier computes the ciphertexts
using these ACDs, random numbers and the homomorphic
public key of the respective DNOs, and then verifies the
correctness of the received ACDs by comparing the computed
ciphertexts to the ciphertexts received from the DCC. Finally,
the TSO aggregates all the received ACDs.
It should be emphasized that, as the result of using
the decentralised and selective data aggregation approach,
DEP2SA can offer significant bandwidth savings compared
to the centralised aggregation approach. For example, with
the decentralised aggregation approach, each gateway sends
a single message containing only Ns ciphertexts, where Ns
is the number of suppliers in a liberalised electricity market.
In contrast, with the centralised aggregation approach, the
ciphertexts generated by every single SM will have to be sent
to the central aggregating entity (the DCC).
B. System Initialisation
The system initialisation comprises three phases: (1) system
parameters setup, (2) key generation and distribution and (3)
SM/GW installation and key establishment.
1) System Parameters Setup: A trusted authority (TA)
generates the system’s parameters, (G,GT , q, g, e), defines a
hash function, H , selects a random number xta
R←− Zq and
computes yta = gxta . Here, xta ∈ Zq is the system’s master
secret key and yta ∈ G is the system’s master public key. TA
keeps xta secret, but publishes all other system parameters,
i.e., {G,GT , q, g, e, yta, H}.
2) Key Generation and Distribution: This phase is divided
into three steps outlined below.
Step 1 is executed during a license acquisition process:
• The DCC, TSO, DNOs and suppliers each generates a
distinct BLS public/secret key pair, {yi, xi}, using the
KeyGen algorithm described in Section IV-A1. These
keys are used for data verification/signing.
• The TSO, DNOs and the suppliers each generates a dis-
tinct public/private key pair, {pki, ski}, using a standard
public-key algorithm such as RSA. These keys are for
data encryption and decryption.
• DNOs each generates a distinct homomorphic pub-
lic/private key pair, {hpkdj , hskdj}, using the KeyGen
algorithm described in Section IV-B.
• The TA signs all the public keys generated by the DCC,
TSO, DNOs and suppliers with its secret key, xta. These
are done through the generation of a digital certificate for
all such keys of each entity.
Step 2 is executed during SM manufacturing process:
• Each SM generates a distinct BLS public/secret key pair,
{ysmi , xsmi}.
• The TA generates a digital certificate for the public key
of each SM.
• Each SM is equipped with the digital certificate certifying
its public key. The corresponding secret key is kept secret
and tamper-proof.
Step 3 is executed during GW manufacturing process:
• Each GW generates a distinct BLS public/secret key pair,
{ybgβ , xbgβ}.
• The DCC generates and signs a certificate for the public
key generated by each GW.
• Each GW is equipped with the certificate certifying its
public key. The corresponding secret key is kept secret
and tamper-proof.
All the entities’ keys and certificates are listed in Table III.
For simplicity, the table only lists the entity’s ID and certified
keys contained in each certificate. A certificate typically con-
tains a number of data items including: version number, serial
number, issuing certification authority’s (CA’s) ID, CA’s digital
signature, subject/owner, owner’s public key, validity period,
certificate usage, signature algorithm and extensions. Also for
the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that, if an entity has more
than one public key, all the public keys are certified in a single
certificate.
3) SM/GW Installation and Key Establishment: This phase
is also divided into three steps outlined below.
Step 1: During an SM installation, the digital certificates of
the SM’s regional DNO, its local BG and its user’s contracted
supplier are installed onto the SM.
Step 2: During a GW installation, each BG is installed with
the certificates of its child SMs and its parent NG. Similarly,
each NG is installed with its child BGs’ and its parent WG’s
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Fig. 4. SM report generation: the PSM processing step.
certificates, and each WG with its child NGs’ and DCC’s
certificates. Each GW is installed with its regional DNO’s
certificate and has a list of its child SMs/GWs.
Step 3: After the installations, each BG establishes a secure
channel with each of its child SMs. This can be done by
establishing a shared secret (i.e., a symmetric key), e.g., kbgβ ,
between the entities using a standard security protocol such as
TLS [40]. This secret should be updated regularly.
C. DEP2SA in Detail
The DEP2SA scheme consists of three parts: (1) SM report
generation, (2) decentralised and selective data aggregation
and (3) data distribution and access.
1) SM Report Generation: At every time slot tn, each SM
generates a report that contains its user’s ECD and sends it
to its local BG. This processing step (PSM) is described next
and shown in Fig. 4.
PSM: At the start of a slot, say tn+1, each SM, smi,
constructs a message that contains its user’s ECD consumed
during the previous slot, tn, and sends the message to its local
BG, bgβ . In detail, smi performs the following operations.
1. It reads its user’s CD in slot tn, etnsmi , from its register.
2. It encrypts etnsmi with its regional DNO’s homomorphic
public key generating Ctnsmi = Enchpkdj (e
tn
smi). This
encryption is to protect etnsmi against eavesdropping attacks
by unauthorised entities.
3. It encrypts {IDsu ‖ Ctnsmi} with the symmetric key it
shares with bgβ generating csmi = Ekbgβ (IDsu ‖ Ctnsmi),
where IDsu is the ID of the user’s supplier, su. This
encryption is to protect the confidentiality of (i) etnsmi
against eavesdropping attacks by authorised entities (i.e.,
the regional DNO that holds the homomorphic private
key, hskdj ) and (ii) IDsu against eavesdropping attacks
by unauthorised entities.
4. It constructs Msmi = {IDsmi ‖ IDbgβ ‖ IDdj ‖ csmi ‖
TStn ‖ TSsmi}, where IDsmi , IDbgβ and IDdj are the
IDs of the SM, local BG and regional DNO, respectively,
TStn is the time stamp of the slot tn, used to uniquely
identify the slot (e.g., date-tn), and TSsmi is the SM’s
local time stamp used to resist replay attacks.
5. It signs on Msmi to generate a signature, σsmi =
H(Msmi)
xsmi , which is used to resist active attacks (any
forgery or unauthorised modification of data).
6. It constructs and sends msgsmi = {Msmi ‖ σsmi} to its
local BG, e.g., bgβ .
2) Decentralised and Selective Data Aggregation: At every
time slot, tn, users’ ECDs are grouped and aggregated at
various levels in the network. In other words, data aggregations
are performed progressively at different nodes as the data
traverse across the different networks. At each GW, data
aggregation is performed respectively based on the users’
suppliers, and at the DCC, based on the users’ suppliers as
well as locations. This part consists of four processing steps:
PBG, PNG, PWG and PDCC,1.
PBG: Each BG receives messages from its child SMs,
verifies and groups them based on the users’ suppliers, ag-
gregates the ECDs contained in the messages in each group,
and sends the aggregated ECDs (AECDs) to its upstream NG.
If some of the received messages fail to arrive or fail the
verifications after multiple attempts, the BG reports the SMs
that dispatch the unsuccessful messages to its regional DNO,
and aggregates only the ECDs carried in messages that have
passed successfully the verifications. A flowchart of the BG’s
operations is shown in Fig. 5 and explained below.
1. At the start of slot tn+1, each BG, bgβ , changes the
status of all its child SMs on its list to mp (i.e., it is
pending receipt of messages), resets its registers and starts
a countdown timer, tmr1. This timer sets the maximum
time period bgβ should wait for any pending messages
before it performs a batch verification of signatures on
the received and partially verified messages. The value of
this period should be chosen such that, by the expiration
of this value, bgβ should have received messages from
all of the SMs it connects, so that it could batch verify
them. This batch verification is used to reduce the com-
putational cost at bgβ (more details are given shortly).
2. bgβ checks the timers’ status (more details are given
below).
3. bgβ checks if it has received a new message.
4. For each received message, msgsmi , bgβ verifies the data
contained in the message in terms of:
a) freshness (V fr), i.e., it checks if the difference
between its local time stamp and the time stamp
contained in msgsmi is less than a predefined value
(t∆), i.e., if |TSbgβ − TSsmi | ≤ t∆,
b) recipient (V rec), i.e., it checks if the ID of the
intended recipient of msgsmi , IDbgβ , is the same as
its own ID contained in its certificate,
c) sender (V sen), i.e., it checks if the ID of the claimed
sender of msgsmi , IDsmi , is the same as the ID of one
of its child SMs on its list,
d) status (V st), i.e., it checks if smi’s status on its list
is mp,
e) time slot (V ts), i.e., it checks if TStn is the expected
one (in sequence).
V fr is used to resist replay attacks. V rec and V sen
are used to eliminate messages that are not destined
(expected) to (by) bgβ . V
st and V ts are used to resist
faulty/malicious SMs which send (i) more than one au-
thentic messages during tn and (ii) messages containing
CDs measured at a time slot different than tn, respec-
tively. These verification methods are lightweight and aim
to detect faulty/malicious SMs as early as possible, reduce
computational costs at BGs and ensure that the correct
data are aggregated.
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Fig. 5. A flowchart of the operations at a BG: the PBG processing step.
5. It changes smi’s status on its list to mr (received) and
performs a pairing operation, i.e., e(ysmi , H(Msmi)). An
SM with status mr means that its message passed the
initial lightweight verifications described in the previous
step.
6. If some messages fail to arrive or fail to pass any of the
verifications before the expiration of tmr1, bgβ starts tmr2
(i.e., extends the period set by tmr1) and requests SMs
with status mp on its list to resend their messages. Note
that if bgβ receives messages from all the SMs it connects
before the expiration of tmr1 and if these messages are
authentic, bgβ skips this step.
7. It computes an aggregate signature of the messages
from SMs with status mr, i.e., σagg =
∏
σsmi , where
smi ∈ {SMbgβ ,dj∧ has a status mr}, and verifies σagg
using the batch verification method (V σ
agg
), i.e., if
e(g, σagg) =
∏
e(ysmi , H(Msmi)). If V
σagg is positive,
bgβ accepts the messages, changes the SMs’ status from
mr to ma (authentic), decrypts csmi in the messages
using kbgβ and skips the next step. Note that this step
is not necessary, but it is good for efficiency as, to
batch verify x messages, bgβ has to perform x + 1
computationally expensive pairing operations, as opposed
to 2x, if it verifies them one by one. An SM with status
ma means that its message passed all the verifications
and the ciphertext in the message can be aggregated.
8. If V σ
agg
is not positive or is not performed, then for
each msgsmi from SMs with status m
r, bgβ performs
signature verification (V σ), i.e., checks if e(g, σsmi) =
e(ysmi , H(Msmi)). If V
σ is positive, bgβ changes the
status of smi to ma and decrypts csmi contained in msgsmi .
Otherwise, if V σ is negative, it changes the status to mp
and requests smi to retransmit msgsmi .
9. It groups and aggregates users’ ECDs (from SMs with
status ma) based on the users’ suppliers (i.e., the ECDs
destined to the same supplier are aggregated into one
AECD), i.e., Ctnbgβ ,dj ,su =
∏
Ctnsmi for u = {1, . . . ,Ns},
where smi ∈ {SMbgβ ,dj ,su∧ has a status ma}. If its
registers are reset, bgβ stores C
tn
bgβ ,dj ,su
. Otherwise it
multiplies them with the ones already stored and updates
its registers with the result. Then, it changes the status
of the SMs from ma to magg (aggregated), i.e., the
ciphertexts in their messages were aggregated.
10. If tmr2 times out, bgβ reports all the SMs with status m
p
to the regional DNO using a standard protocol such as
TLS (satisfying (F1)). Note that bgβ skips this step if it
receives messages from all the SMs it connects before
expiration of {tmr1 + tmr2} and if all the messages pass
V fr, V rec, V sen, V st, V ts and V σ verifications.
11. It reads the supplier-based AECDs from its registers,
constructs msgbgβ = {Mbgβ ‖ σbgβ}, where Mbgβ =
{IDbgβ ‖ IDngη ‖ IDdj ‖ (IDs1 ‖ Ctnbgβ ,dj ,s1) ‖
. . . ‖ (IDsNs ‖ Ctnbgβ ,dj ,sNs ) ‖ TS
tn ‖ TSbgβ}, σbgβ =
H(Mbgβ )
xbgβ , sends msgbgβ to its local NG, resets its
timers, and waits until the start of the next slot.
Note that SMs’ status helps a BG keep track of the SMs
whose (i) messages are pending and (ii) data are aggregated.
So, DEP2SA allows further information to be included in the
aggregated messages along the network such as the aggregate
value includes x out y SMs (y-x failed to report). This number
would be different at each level, as appropriate.
PNG & PWG: The operations performed by each NG
(WG) are similar to those carried out by BGs except that the
messages processed are from BGs (NGs), and the symmetric
decryption in Steps 7 and 8 is skipped as none of the GWs
perform encryption tasks. For example, bgβ , in contrast to smi,
sends {IDsu ‖ Ctnbgβ ,dj ,su} as it is.
PDCC,1: The operations performed by the DCC are similar
to those performed by NGs/WGs except that the messages
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for i = 1, . . . ,Nsm
• {IDsu ‖ Ctnsmi} = Dkbgβ (csmi),
end
for u = 1, . . . ,Ns
• Ctnbgβ ,dj ,su =
∏
Ctnsmi , smi ∈ SMbgβ ,dj ,su
end
Mbgβ = IDbgβ ‖ IDngη ‖ IDdj ‖ (IDs1
‖ Ctnbgβ ,dj ,s1) ‖ . . . ‖ (IDsNs
‖ Ctnbgβ ,dj ,sNs ) ‖ TS
tn ‖ TSbgβ ,
σbgβ = H(Mbgβ )
xbgβ ,
msgbgβ = {Mbgβ ‖ σbgβ}.
for u = 1, . . . ,Ns
• Ctnngη,dj ,su =
∏Nbg
β=1 C
tn
bgβ ,dj ,su
,
end
Mngη = IDngη ‖ IDwgω ‖ IDdj ‖ (IDs1
‖ Ctnngη,dj ,s1) ‖ . . . ‖ (IDsNs
‖ Ctnngη,dj ,sNs ) ‖ TS
tn ‖ TSngη ,
σngη = H(Mngη )
xngη ,
msgngη = {Mngη ‖ σngη}.
for u = 1, . . . ,Ns
• Ctnwgω,dj ,su =
∏Nng
η=1 C
tn
ngη,dj ,su
,
end
Mwgω = IDwgω ‖ IDdcci ‖ IDdj ‖ (IDs1
‖ Ctnwgω,dj ,s1) ‖ . . . ‖ (IDsNs
‖ Ctnwgω,dj ,sNs ) ‖ TS
tn ‖ TSwgω ,
σwgω = H(Mwgω )
xwgω ,
msgwgω = {Mwgω ‖ σwgω}.
for j = 1, . . . ,Nd
for u = 1, . . . ,Ns
Ctndj ,su =
∏Nwg
ω=1 C
tn
wgω,dj ,su
,
end
end
msgbgβ
msgngη msgwgω
PBG PNG PWG PDCC,1
Fig. 6. Decentralised and selective data aggregation: the main operations of the PBG, PNG, PWG and PDCC,1 processing steps.
DCC
su
dj
TSO
for j = 1, . . . ,Nd
• Mdcc,dj = IDdcc ‖ IDdj ‖ (IDs1 ‖ Ctndj ,s1) ‖
. . . ‖ (IDsNs ‖ Ctndj ,sNs ) ‖ TS
tn ‖ TSdcc,
• σdcc,dj = H(Mdcc,dj )xdcc ,
• msgdcc,dj = {Mdcc,dj ‖ σdcc,dj},
end
for u = 1, . . . ,Ns
• Mdcc,su = IDdcc ‖ IDsu ‖ (IDd1 ‖ Ctnd1,su) ‖
. . . ‖ (IDdNd ‖ C
tn
dNd ,su
) ‖ TStn ‖ TSdcc,
• σdcc,su = H(Mdcc,su)xdcc ,
• msgdcc,su = {Mdcc,su ‖ σdcc,su},
end
perform V fr, V rec, V sen, V ts, V σ of msgdcc,dj ,
for u = 1, . . . ,Ns
• recover ∑ (Etndj ,su) = Dechskdj (Ctndj ,su),
• rtndj ,su = (Ctndj ,su .g
−Σ(Etndj ,su )modn)
n−1modλdj
modn,
• msgdj ,su = {
∑
(Etndj ,su) ‖ rtndj ,su ‖ TStn},
end∑
(Etndj ) =
∑Ns
u=1
∑
(Etndj ,su),
msgdj ,tso = {
∑
(Etndj ) ‖ TStn}.
perform V fr, V rec, V sen, V ts, V σ of msgdcc,su ,
obtain {(IDd1 ‖ Ctnd1,su), . . . , (IDdNd ‖ C
tn
dNd ,su
) ‖ TStn},
for j = 1, . . . ,Nd
• recover {∑ (Etndj ,su) ‖ rtndj ,su ‖ TStn},
• C˜tndj ,su = g
Σ(Etndj ,su ). (rtndj ,su)
nmodn2,
• accept ∑ (Etndj ,su) if C˜tndj ,su = Ctndj ,su ,
end∑
(Etnsu) =
∑Nd
j=1
∑
(Etndj ,su).
for j = 1, . . . ,Nd
• recover {∑ (Etndj ) ‖ TStn},
end∑
(Etn) =
∑Nd
j=1
∑
(Etndj ).
msgdcc,dj
msgdcc,su
msgdj ,su
msgdj ,tso
PDCC,2
PDCC,3
PDNO
PS PTSO
Fig. 7. Data distribution and access: the PDCC,2, PDCC,3, PDNO, PS and PTSO processing steps.
processed are from WGs, and AECDs are aggregated based
on users’ suppliers and users’ locations (i.e., DNOs) (rather
than just based on the users’ suppliers).
Without loss of generality, Fig. 6 summarises the main oper-
ations in the PBG, PNG, PWG and PDCC,1 processing steps
assuming that all the messages in these steps are authentic and
received on time.
3) Data Distribution and Access: DCC distributes different
sets of AECDs to their respective authorised recipients, i.e.,
DNOs and suppliers. The DNOs recover users’ ACDs from
the AECDs and send respective sets of the ACDs to the TSO
and the corresponding suppliers. These steps are summarised
in Fig. 7 and explained below.
PDCC,2: For each DNO, e.g., dj , DCC constructs a mes-
sage that contains the supplier-based AECDs of the users in
the region managed by the DNO, i.e., {Ctndj ,s1 , . . . , Ctndj ,sNs}. It
then signs the message and sends it to the DNO.
PDCC,3: For each supplier, e.g., su, DCC constructs a
message that contains the region-based AECDs of the users
supplied by the supplier, i.e., {Ctnd1,su , . . . , CtndNd ,su}. It then
signs the message and sends it to the supplier.
As the number of grid operators and suppliers in the grid
is small, the TSO, DNOs and suppliers can use a standard
protocol such as TLS to establish secure and authentic com-
munication channels between each pair of them (or among
themselves). Thus, in the next processing steps we only present
the data which these entities send to each other.
PDNO: Each DNO verifies the message received from
the DCC, recovers the supplier-based ACDs (Ns included
in the message in total) using its homomorphic private key
(satisfying (F2b)), recovers also the random number embedded
in each AECD using (2), and sends both items to the respective
suppliers. Then, it calculates the total ACD in its region, i.e.,∑
(Etndj ) =
∑Ns
u=1
∑
(Etndj ,su ) (satisfying (F2a)), and sends the
result to the TSO.
PS: Each supplier verifies the message received from the
DCC and obtains the region-based AECDs. It then, upon re-
ceiving a message from each DNO, recovers the ACD and the
random number, and use them (together with the homomorphic
public key of the corresponding DNO) to compute the AECD.
If the AECD computed is the same as the AECD received from
the DCC, the supplier accepts the ACD as authentic (satisfying
(F3b)). It then computes the ACD of all its customers, i.e.,∑
(Etnsu ) =
∑Nd
j=1
∑
(Etndj ,su ) (satisfying (F3a)).
PTSO: Upon receiving a message from each DNO, the TSO
recovers the ACD for each DNO, e.g.,
∑
(Etndj ), (satisfying
(F4a)). It then calculates the ACD of all the users in the grid,
i.e.,
∑
(Etn ) =
∑Nd
j=1
∑
(Etndj ) (satisfying (F4b)).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we analyse the security and privacy properties
of the DEP2SA scheme.
A. Protocol Message Authenticity
Each message in the DEP2SA scheme contains a BLS short
signature which is proven secure under chosen-message attack
in the random oracle model assuming that the Computational
Diffie-Hellman problem is hard [37], [38]. In addition, the
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signature signing keys are stored in tamper-proof devices,
and the corresponding signature verification keys are certified
by the TA. Hence, DEP2SA provides assurance of source
authentication, non-repudiation of origin and integrity of each
protocol message (satisfying (S1)). Any active attacks on the
data in transit can be detected and the modified data discarded.
Including a time stamp in each message also ensures that all
received messages are fresh.
B. Confidentiality of Users’ CDs
In DEP2SA, users’ CDs are encrypted at their source
(SMs) using the Paillier cryptosystem, then the ECDs are
progressively aggregated, and the AECDs are delivered to
DNOs, where ACDs are recovered and selections of them are
delivered, respectively, to their need-to-know entities (TSO
and suppliers). As the Paillier cryptosystem is semantically
secure against chosen plaintext attacks (assuming that the
Composite Residuosity Class problem is hard [3]) and com-
munication channels connecting the TSO, DNOs and suppliers
are secure and authentic (e.g., established using TLS), only
authorised entities (i.e., the TSO, DNOs and suppliers) can
access the ACDs of users (satisfying (S2)). All the external
entities and unauthorised internal entities (including GWs, the
DCC), should they eavesdrop messages in transit, would only
be able to access the ECDs or AECDs (but not ACDs) of the
users.
C. User Privacy-preservation
With DEP2SA, a DNO receives only the supplier-based
AECDs of the users located in its region of operation. In
other words, the most fine grained CDs which a DNO and
a supplier have access to is the ACDs of a set of users located
in a particular region and supplied by a particular supplier, and
usually the size of this set is on the order of thousands. Even
authorised entities (i.e., the TSO, DNOs, suppliers) do not
have access to individual users’ CDs. Moreover, unlike other
schemes, DEP2SA is also resistant against eavesdropping at-
tacks by authorised entities as users’ CDs are double encrypted
(first with the regional DNO’s homomorphic public key and
then with the key shared between the SMs and their local BG)
while in transit between the SMs and the BG. For the similar
reason, if DNOs’ homomorphic private keys are compromised,
DEP2SA can still operate and protect users’ privacy as the
most fine-grained data attackers could access is the AECDs
sent by BGs. As long as these AECDs contain the ACDs of a
sufficient number of users (more details are given in Section
VII), it is hard for attackers to work out individual users’
CDs (satisfying (S3)). Also, as the IDs of users’ contracted
suppliers are encrypted while in transit between SMs and BGs,
eavesdroppers can not figure out which supplier is contracted
by which user.
D. Authorisation to Access Users’ ACDs
The ‘principle of least privilege’ (i.e., only allow an entity
to have access to data just sufficient for it to carry out
its duties (business responsibilities)) has been applied in the
TABLE IV
SECURITY LEVEL COMPARISON
[5] [6] [7] [8] [9] DEP2SA
Message authenticity
√ √ √ √
Confidentiality
√ √ √ √ √ √
User privacy preservation
√
Authorisation
√
Availability
√
design of DEP2SA. The use of the region-based cryptographic
key deployment (i.e., each DNO has its own homomorphic
public/private key pair) combined with the recipient-based
selective aggregation of users’ ECDs ensures that only the
DNOs that need to know a set of users’ CDs can actually
decrypt the ACD of this set, thus making the scheme resilient
to attacks mounted by external and authorised internal entities
such as the elevation of privilege attacks (satisfying (S4)).
Also, the use of the recipient-based selective distribution of
ACDs ensures that suppliers receive only the ACDs of their
customers.
E. Availability
DEP2SA is designed with resilience to DoS attacks in mind.
As it uses a decentralised approach to message verifications
and data aggregation, there is no entity in the system that
bares an imbalanced processing load during an execution
of the scheme, thus avoiding the creation of a performance
bottleneck. This approach brings us an extra advantage, i.e.,
malicious or unauthorised messages can be detected by a
node that is one-hop away from their originators and can
immediately be discarded upon the detections. In addition, the
verifying entities first deploy lightweight verification methods
to detect any unauthorised messages, thus reducing the risks
of any DoS attacks affecting the performance of DEP2SA
(satisfying (S5)).
F. Security Level Comparison
The security properties achieved by DEP2SA in comparison
with related schemes [5]–[9] are summarised in Table IV.
Compared to these schemes, DEP2SA achieves the highest
level of protections.
G. Cloud-based DCC
Delegating the operations of the DCC to a semi-trusted
cloud service provider should not affect the security and
privacy properties of the DEP2SA scheme. The DCC only
handles, and operates on, ciphertexts, so its operations can
be delegated to a semi-trusted cloud service provider. This
provider will not have access to any of the CDs and/or ACDs
of users. To ensure the correct operation of the DEP2SA
scheme, the provider should aggregate the ciphertexts gen-
erated by subsets of users (the ciphertexts attached with
the same DNOs and suppliers IDs form one subset) and
then distribute the aggregated ciphertexts to their respective
authorised recipients (i.e., DNOs and suppliers). Considering
that a cloud service provider is usually paid based on the
12
amount of data it processes, and that the amount of data a
service provider is expected to process (in our system model)
at any given time slot will be constant (as the number of SMs
served would remain the same for a given time slot), there is
no financial incentive for the cloud service provider to group
and aggregate the ciphertexts incorrectly as this will not affect
the amount of money payable to the service provider. On the
contrary, there is every incentive for the cloud service provider
to perform the aggregations and to provide the DCC services
correctly and truthfully, as this will enhance its reputation,
which, in turn, can increase its business standing and market
share.
VII. USER PRIVATE DATA LEAKAGE FROM AGGREGATED
CONSUMPTION DATA
Although the authorised entities in DEP2SA receive only
ACDs (not individual users’ CDs), they may still manage to
obtain some of the individual users’ private data by analysing
the received ACDs. In this section we discuss potential private
data leakage from ACDs and propose a simple method to
quantify it. Such method can be used for finding out the
minimum number of users whose CDs should be aggregated
such that the resulted ACD provides sufficient user privacy
preservation.
A. Problem Description and Our Aim
Suppose that there are two sets of users. The first set has
10000 users and the set of CDs of these users is denoted
as E104 . The second set has only two users and the set of
CDs of these two users is denoted as E2. If an entity has
access only to the ACD of the first set of users, denoted as∑
(E104), it would be difficult (if not impossible) for the entity
to disaggregate
∑
(E104) into CDs of individual users. The
entity may only learn some statistical patterns of this set of
users, but not individual users’ consumption patterns or some
relevant behaviours or activities.
However, this is not the case for the second set of users.
Owing to the small number of users in it, if an entity has
access to the ACD of this set of users, i.e.,
∑
(E2), it may be
feasible for the entity to disaggregate
∑
(E2) into individual
components and learn each of the users’ raw CDs. The
entity then, with the help of NILM techniques, can translate
such users’ raw CDs into users’ specific behaviours/activities,
breaching the users’ privacy. It is worth noting that with a
small set of users, even the ACD such as
∑
(E2) can be
translated to users’ specific activities, as
∑
(E2) may not be
sufficient to disguise some specific appliance load signatures.
The example above clearly shows that the level of private
data leakage from an ACD is dependent on individual users’
CDs and the number of users whose CDs formed the ACD.
How to measure/quantify such leakage is an open question.
Our aim is to propose a method that can quantify the level
of private data leakage from an ACD, thus to provide the
designers of SG/AMI with a tool to find out the minimum
number of users whose CDs should be aggregated so that the
risk of inferring a user’s private behavior or activities from the
ACD can be controlled at an acceptable level.
B. Definitions and Experimental Dataset
We define a notation of ‘strong’ user privacy if none of
the entities (described in Section III-A) can access individual
users’ raw CDs and/or detect some specific human activities
or appliance operations and link them to individual users.
We also define a notation of ‘strong’ adversary capability
if the adversary (including authorised entities) has a NILM
algorithm that can decompose an user’s CD into a set of
appliance CDs with 100% accuracy.
Our analysis is based on a real-life dataset, “Electricity
Customer Behaviour Trial” [41], that contains 6,287 users’
CDs collected at 30-minute intervals for 536 days.
C. Our Hypothesis
Usually the ACD of a large number of users is available
in the public domain. For example, the real-time electricity
demand data of a country (or a region in a county) are regularly
published by the county’s grid operators (e.g., the real-time
demand data of UK is available at [42]). These data can give
some indications of the electricity consumption patterns of
the country’s entire population. However, owing to the large
number of users in the set, it is hard for an adversary to learn a
particular user’s consumption pattern (specific activities) from
the ACD. The only useful information the adversary may get
from the ACD is the users’ overall behaviour.
Assuming that an adversary has access to the ACD of a
large number of users,
∑
(Ex), we argue that the ACD of
a subset of these users,
∑
(Ey), would leak no or minimum
information with regards to an individual user’s private data
as long as
∑
(Ey) follows the same trend as
∑
(Ex), i.e.,
as long as the difference between the two ACD distributions
over a period of time, PΣ(Etnx ) and PΣ(Etny ), is negligible. The
difference between the two distributions can be measured by
the K-divergence [43], i.e.,
K =
Nt∑
n=1
PΣ(Etny ) log
2PΣ(Etny )
PΣ(Etny ) + PΣ(Etnx )
. (3)
An advantageous property of the K-divergence as compared
to other distance measures, such as the the relative entropy, is
that its value is between zero and one [43].
D. The Experiment and Results
Here we use the dataset from [41] to analyse the statistical
differences between the ACD distribution of all the users in a
neighbourhood and the ACD distributions of various subsets
of these users over a 24-hour time period. The ACD of users
in a given set can be computed by:∑
(EtnNsm) =
Nsm∑
i=1
etnsmi , for n = {1, . . .Nt}, (4)
where etnsmi is the CD during tn of the ith user in the set, Nt
is the resolution of CDs (e.g., in a given period of 24 hours,
if CDs are taken at every 30-minute interval, then Nt = 48)
and Nsm is the size of the set (which is the number of users
whose CDs are aggregated).
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(l) Nsm = 6287, K = 0
Fig. 8. The ACD distributions of subsets with an increasing number of users from a dataset, i.e., P
Σ(Etn1 )
(8a), ..., P
Σ(Etn5000)
(8k), and the ACD distribution
of all the users in the dataset, i.e., P
Σ(Etn6287)
(8l), over a 24-hour period.
The experiment is carried out as follows. First a 24-hour
period is randomly chosen, a set containing the CDs during
this period of all the users from the dataset, i.e., E6287
(Nsm = 6287, equivalent to a typical neighbourhood), is
formed and the ACD of all the users in the set, i.e.,
∑
(Etn6287),
is computed using (4). Then a subset of E6287 containing the
CD of only one randomly chosen user from the dataset is
formed. Next, iteratively, the CD of another randomly chosen
user from the remaining dataset is included in the subset.
After each iteration the ACD of all the users in the subset
is computed using (4). Then the distributions of the ACD of
all the users in (i) different versions of the subset, i.e., PΣ(EtnNsm )
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Fig. 9. The K-divergence between the ACD distribution of all the users (i.e.,
6287 users) in a dataset and the ACD distributions of random subsets with
varying number of users from the same dataset.
for Nsm = {1, . . . , 6286} (some shown in Fig. 8a to Fig. 8k),
and (ii) in E6287, i.e., PΣ(Etn6287) (Fig. 8l), over the 24-hour
period are computed by:
PΣ(EtnNsm )
=
∑
(EtnNsm)
Nt∑
n=1
∑
(EtnNsm)
. (5)
The K-divergence between each of PΣ(EtnNsm )
(Nsm = {1,
. . . , 6286}) and PΣ(Etn6287) are computed using (3). As shown
in Fig. 8, as Nsm increases, PΣ(EtnNsm )
becomes more similar
to PΣ(Etn6287), thus the K-divergence between them decreases
accordingly. The more similar the two distributions are, the
less individual users’ private data is leaked from
∑
(EtnNsm).
Therefore, the K-divergence value can be used as a measure
of the level of private data leakage from ACDs. The smaller K
is, the less private data about individual users could be leaked.
To minimise the effect of the order in the selection of the
members of the subset ENsm (Nsm = {1, . . . , 6286}), we run
our experiment 100 times with 100 different and randomly
chosen such subsets and compute the average K-divergence
value (as shown in Fig. 9). We observe that as we increase
Nsm, the K-divergence (the difference) between PΣ(EtnNsm )
and
PΣ(Etn6287)
decreases rapidly until it reaches a value (i.e., KT =
5 ∗ 10−3) after which further increasing Nsm has a negligible
effect on K. KT can be used as a threshold value for preserving
individual users’ privacy when users’ ACDs are used. In other
words, to ensure that the ACD of a set of users does not
leak individual users’ private data (i.e., to preserve a sufficient
level of privacy for the user in the set), the minimum number
of users included in the set should be such that the resulting
K value is lower than KT.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the DEP2SA scheme in terms of
computational complexity imposed on various entities in the
system and the communication overheads incurred between
SMs and the DCC. We also compare the performance of
DEP2SA with the performances of two state-of-the-art aggre-
gation schemes: the efficient privacy-preserving aggregation
scheme [8], named as EPPA, and the decentralised security
framework [9], named as DSF. As in DEP2SA, both schemes
use homomorphic enctryption technique (the Paillier cryp-
tosystem) to protect users’ privacy. However, EPPA aggregates
users’ CDs only at BGs, whereas DSF, similar to DEP2SA,
aggregates the data also at NGs and WGs.
A. Computational Complexity
Computationally expensive operations used in DEP2SA
are exponentiation operation in Zn2 (EOZ), exponentiation
operation in G (EOG) and pairing operation (PO).
In DEP2SA, and in each time slot, an SM performs one EOZ
to encrypt its user’s CD, and one EOG to sign its message;
a BG does (Nsm + 1) POs to perform a batch verification of
messages from its child SMs and one EOG to sign its message;
similarly, an NG and a WG performs (Nbg + 1) POs and one
EOG, and (Nng + 1) POs and one EOG, respectively; DCC
performs (NGwg + 1) POs and (Nd + Ns) EOGs to sign its
message for each DNO and supplier.
As EPPA [8] and DSF [9] use a single-recipient system
model, and to meet the functional requirements, in each time
slot, an SM performs three EOZs to encrypt its CD three
times using the homomorphic public keys of three different
recipients (the TSO, its regional DNO and supplier) and three
EOGs to sign three different messages destined to each of
these recipients; a BG does 2(Nsm + 1) and Ns(NsmNs + 1) POs
to perform batch verifications of the messages destined to the
TSO and DNO, and Ns number of suppliers, respectively, and
(2 + Ns) EOGs to sign (2 + Ns) different messages (to TSO,
DNO and each of the suppliers). As EPPA [8] aggregates
data only at BGs, the computational costs at NGs and WGs
are negligible (the messages are simply forwarded), whereas
DCC performs (NGwgNngNbg(2 + Ns) + Nd(1 + Ns) + 1) POs
to verify the messages sent from the BGs and destined to
TSO, DNOs and suppliers, and (Nd + Ns + 1) EOGs to sign
a different message to the TSO, each DNO and each supplier.
As DSF [9] aggregates data also at NGs and WGs, each NG
and WG perform (Nbg+1)(2+Ns) and (Nng+1)(2+Ns) POs,
and (2 +Ns) and (2 +Ns) EOGs, respectively, whereas DCC
performs (NGwg(2+Ns)+Nd(1+Ns)+1) POs and (Nd+Ns+1)
EOGs.
We denote EOZ, EOG and PO as oez , oeg and op, re-
spectively, and summarise the computational complexities of
DEP2SA, EPPA [8] and DSF [9] in Table V. We have also
conducted experiments with the PBC [44] and MIRACL [45]
libraries on a 3.0 GHz-processor and 4 GB-memory machine
to study the operational costs of EOZ, EOG and PO. The
experimental results show that EOZ (|n2| = 2, 048) costs
84.4 µs, EOG in G with 160 bits 43.5 µs and PO 136.1 µs. We
set Nsm = 268, Nbg = 28, Nng = 32, NGwg = 140 and Nd = 14,
so AMI could cover the entire grid in UK [35]. We depict the
variations of computational costs in terms of Ns (the number
of suppliers in a liberalised market) in Fig. 10. Compared to
EPPA [8], DEP2SA has slightly more computational costs at
an NG and a WG (as EPPA only forwards messages at NGs
and WGs), but significantly less computational costs at a BG,
and specifically at the DCC. Compared to DSF [9], DEP2SA
introduces significantly less computational costs at each entity.
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TABLE V
COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY COMPARISON
EPPA [8]
SM 3oez + 3oeg
BG (3Nsm + 2 + Ns) ∗ op + (2 + Ns) ∗ oeg
NG negligible
WG negligible
DCC (NGwgNngNbg(2 + Ns) + Nd(1 + Ns) + 1) ∗ op + (Nd + Ns + 1) ∗ oeg
DSF [9]
SM 3oez + 3oeg
BG (3Nsm + 2 + Ns) ∗ op + (2 + Ns) ∗ oeg
NG (Nbg + 1)(2 + Ns) ∗ op + (2 + Ns) ∗ oeg
WG (Nng + 1)(2 + Ns) ∗ op + (2 + Ns) ∗ oeg
DCC (NGwg(2 + Ns) + Nd(1 + Ns) + 1) ∗ op + (Nd + Ns + 1) ∗ oeg
DEP2SA
SM oez + oeg
BG (Nsm + 1) ∗ op + oeg
NG (Nbg + 1) ∗ op + oeg
WG (Nng + 1) ∗ op + oeg
DCC (NGwg + 1) ∗ op + (Nd + Ns) ∗ oeg
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Fig. 10. Computational cost comparison at a BG, NG, WG and DCC.
B. Communication Overheads
The communication overheads introduced by DEP2SA are
largely in four parts: the overhead incurred (1) when SMs
send data to a BG (denoted as SMs-to-BG), (2) when BGs
send data to an NG (BGs-to-NG), (3) when NGs send data
to a WG (NGs-to-WG), and (4) when WGs send data to the
DCC (WGs-to-DCC).
With DEP2SA in each time slot, each SM sends its report,
msgsmi = {IDsmi ‖ IDbgβ ‖ IDdj ‖ csmi ‖ TStn ‖ TSsmi ‖
σsmi}, to its local BG. Considering that each BG collects data
from Nsm SMs, the SMs-to-BG communication overhead is
Nsm ∗ (3|ID| + 2|TS| + |σ| + |c|). Similarly, each BG sends
only a single message, msgbgβ = {IDbgβ ‖ IDngη ‖ IDdj ‖
(IDs1 ‖ Ctnbgβ ,dj ,s1) ‖ . . . ‖ (IDsNs ‖ C
tn
bgβ ,dj ,sNs
) ‖ TStn ‖
TSbgβ ‖ σbgβ}, to its local NG. Considering that each NG
collects data from Nbg BGs, the BGs-to-NG communication
overhead is Nbg ∗ (3|ID| + 2|TS| + |σ| + Ns ∗ (|ID| + |C|)).
Similarly, the NGs-to-WG and WGs-to-DCC communication
overheads are Nng ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ Ns ∗ (|ID|+ |C|))
and NGwg∗(3|ID|+2|TS|+ |σ|+Ns∗(|ID|+ |C|)), respectively.
In contrast to DEP2SA, in EPPA [8] and DSF [9], each SM
sends 3 different messages of the form {IDsmi ‖ IDbgβ ‖ IDr ‖
Ctnsmi ‖ TStn ‖ TSsmi ‖ σsmi} to three different recipients
(i.e., r = {dj , tso, su}). Hence, the SMs-to-BG communication
overhead is 3Nsm ∗ (3|ID|+2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|). Each BG sends
(2 + Ns) different messages of the same form to (2 + Ns)
different recipients (i.e., r = {dj , tso, s1, . . . , sNs}). Hence, the
BGs-to-NG communication overhead is Nbg∗(2+Ns)∗(3|ID|+
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TABLE VI
COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON
EPPA [8]
SMs-to-BG 3Nsm ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|)
BGs-to-NG Nbg ∗ (2 + Ns) ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|)
NGs-to-WG NngNbg ∗ (2 + Ns) ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|)
WGs-to-DCC NGwgNngNbg ∗ (2 + Ns) ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|)
DSF [9]
SMs-to-BG 3Nsm ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|)
BGs-to-NG Nbg ∗ (2 + Ns) ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|)
NGs-to-WG Nng ∗ (2 + Ns) ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|)
WGs-to-DCC NGwg ∗ (2 + Ns) ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|)
DEP2SA
SMs-to-BG Nsm ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ |c|)
BGs-to-NG Nbg ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ Ns ∗ (|ID|+ |C|))
NGs-to-WG Nng ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ Ns ∗ (|ID|+ |C|))
WGs-to-DCC NGwg ∗ (3|ID|+ 2|TS|+ |σ|+ Ns ∗ (|ID|+ |C|))
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Fig. 11. Communication overhead comparison at the SMs-to-BG, BGs-to-NG, NGs-to-WG and WGs-to-DCC parts.
2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|). Similarly, in DSF [9], the NGs-to-WG and
WGs-to-DCC communication overheads are Nng ∗ (2 + Ns) ∗
(3|ID|+2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|) and NGwg∗(2+Ns)∗(3|ID|+2|TS|+
|σ| + |C|), respectively. As in EPPA [8] the NGs and WGs
simply forward messages without performing any aggregation,
the NGs-to-WG and WGs-to-DCC communication overheads
are NngNbg ∗ (2 + Ns) ∗ (3|ID| + 2|TS| + |σ| + |C|) and
NGwgNngNbg∗(2+Ns)∗(3|ID|+2|TS|+ |σ|+ |C|), respectively.
The communication overheads introduced by DEP2SA,
EPPA [8] and DSF [9] are summarised in Table VI. Further-
more, using the setting ndj 1024-bit, |ID| and |TS| 32-bit and
G 160-bit long [8], we depict the communication overheads
in terms of Ns in Fig. 11. It can be seen that DEP2SA
introduces less communication overheads than EPPA and
DSF in every communication part. The total communication
overhead between SMs and DCC is shown in Fig. 12. DEP2SA
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Fig. 12. Communication overhead comparison at the SMs-to-DCC part.
has significantly less total communication overhead compared
to EPPA [8] and DSF [9].
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IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel data aggregation
scheme, DEP2SA, that allows grid operators and suppliers
to collect users’ aggregated consumption data efficiently and
with user privacy preservation. DEP2SA combines the use of
homomorphic encryption and selective data aggregation based
on the geographic locations of the data source (i.e., SMs) and
the intended recipients of the aggregated data. As a result,
DEP2SA allows authorised entities to access ACDs of users
on the need-to-know basis, i.e., different authorised entities can
only gain access to the ACDs of the subgroups of users under
their respective managements, thus making the scheme secure
in terms of preserving users’ privacy and readily applicable
to liberalised electricity markets. Also, the adoption of a
decentralised and progressive data verification and aggregation
model makes the scheme both computationally and bandwidth-
wise efficient. Particularly, with this approach, the compu-
tation complexity is independent of the number of SMs in
the system, thus making DEP2SA scalable. Analytical and
numerical results have shown that, in comparison to existing
related schemes, DEP2SA offers significant improvements in
terms of computational complexity and scalability. Security
analysis has demonstrated that DEP2SA satisfies the security
and privacy-preservation requirements specified, including the
principle of least privilege.
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